

## **Public Perception Study in the Post-Coup Myanmar**

Round-I Report June 2021

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#### I. Introduction

This report explores the changes in the everyday lives of the people of Myanmar, the socioeconomic impacts on them and the security issues and administration mechanism of the wards and villages after the military staged a coup on 1st February 2021. It also examines the knowledge, trust and attitudes people have regarding the organizations established following the coup, namely, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a committee comprised of democratically elected representatives ousted by the military coup; the National Unity Government (NUG), the civilian governmentin exile that was formed in opposition to military rule; and the Federal Army<sup>1</sup>, the armed wing of the NUG. On the other hand, how much trust the people of the country have in Tatmadaw – the Armed forces of Myanmar the leaders of which seized power in the February coup - is surveyed. The opinions that people have on the future of Myanmar are also stated in this report.

## 2. Research Methodology

The survey data were collected using the online survey method from the last week of April to the first week of May 2021.

A total of 1,174 people took part in the online survey.66% of respondents were women, 32% men and 2% are those with non-binary gender identities. The majority of the respondents were between 25 to 29 years of age. This is followed by those aged 30-34 years and 16-24 years. Although the survey covered responses from all the States and Regions including Naypyitaw, respondents from Yangon occupies the largest percentage with 46%. Mandalay follows Yangon with 17%. Details are described in Table 1.

Table I: Demographic Profile (Respondents=1174)

	Number	%		Number	%
Sex			States/Region		
Male	385	33	Yangon	539	46
Female	769	66	Mandalay	205	17
Other	20	2	Sagaing	60	5
			Shan (South)	42	4
Age Interval (in Years)			Kachin	39	3
16-24	225	19	Ayeyarwaddy	38	3
25-29	335	29	Mon	35	3
30-34	279	24	Bago (East)	34	3
35-39	169	14	Shan (North)	30	3
40-44	75	6	Tanintharyi	26	2
45-49	51	4	Naypyitaw	25	2
50 and above	40	3	Bago (West)	25	2
			Karen	19	2
Ward/Village			Chin	16	I
Ward	1091	93	Kayah	14	- 1
Village	83	7	Magwe	12	1
			Shan (East)	11	ı
			Rakhine	4	0

I

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Public attitudes towards the Federal Army was included in the survey question as the rise of Federal Army, its representative flag and the logo were popular among people during the time of conducting this survey.

It is to be noted that during the early days of the above mentioned time-frame, periodic internet shutdowns limited participation in the survey to those who were able to access fiber connections. The presence of political constraints hindered the process of disseminating the survey link online, further impacting the representativeness ofthe findings. As an online survey, careful efforts were made to present the survey questions as clearly as possible. Despite this, the respondent's understanding of them might have a small impact on the answers he/she chose.

The percentages presented in the tables and bar charts are rounded values, thus, the summation of these percentages will sometimes exceed or be under 100%. Moreover, the 0% is arbitrary and the real values of them range between 0% and 0.49...%

## 3. Research Findings


Situations regarding the socioeconomic factors; ward and village administration arrangements; security, phone and internet network coverage and accessibility to them; aids received; together with peoples' awareness, familiarity, trust and attitudes towards the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Unity Government (NUG) and Federal Army; trust in Tatmadaw's promise to the civilians and attitudes towards the future of Myanmar are presented in the report in six parts.

## 3.1 Socioeconomic Impacts

#### 3.1.1 Daily life

Among the respondents, 83% state that the military coup has heavily affected their everyday lives. Only 1% of respondents reported that the coup has no impact on them. (Figure 1)

Figure 1: Impact by the current political changes on the everyday lives of people (Respondents=1,174)



## 3.1.2 Family Income

As shown in Figure 2, 43% of the respondents, the highest percentage, reveal that their family income has significantly decreased since the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2021. Another 26% of respondents report that, following the coup, they no longer have any source of income at all. The percentage of respondents who reported increased income levels is negligible (less than 1%).

26%

19%

12%

Significantly increased A bit increased Same as before A bit decreased Significantly decreased No income

Figure 2: Family Income after the Coup (Respondents=1,174)

## 3.2 Ward and Village Administration Arrangements and Security Status

the coup

#### 3.2.1 Ward and Village Administration

In surveying how the ward and village administration have changed after the coup, it is found that in wards and villages that have changes in administrators, 28% of them are new administrators who are appointed by the State Administrative Council and this percentage is the highest. 17% of respondents - the second highest number – report that former (pre-coup) administrators have been re-appointed by the State Administrative Council. There were also 10% of therespondents who have not received any directives and this figure occupies the third highest percentage. (Figure 3)




Figure 3: Changes in Ward and Village Administration (Respondents = 1,174)

#### 3.2.2 Security of Wards and Villages

The majority of the respondents, 62%, do not feel safe living in their wards or villages. 21% feel moderately safe and this percentage is the second highest. Only a few respondents (2%) state that they feel absolutely safe in the place of residence (Figure 4). Nearly half of the respondents, 49%, state that no particular person is taking the lead in managing the ward or village security issues and 24%, the second highest percentage, say that everyone in the respective ward or village is involved in such management. (Figure 5)

62%

21%

15%

2%

Feeling unsafe at all


Feeling a bit safe

Feeling moderately safe

Feeling safe at all

Figure 4: Security Status of Wards/Villages (Respondents=1,174)

Figure 5: Leaders of Ward/Village Security (Respondents=1,174)



#### 3.3 Accessibility of Phone and Internet

#### 3.3.1 Phone

In examining whether respondents had to face any difficulties in using essential communication channels - telephone, the Internet - for everyday communications, it is found that results were almost equally split. During the data collection period, half of respondents did not face any difficulty, while the other half had to go through

difficulties. (Figure 6). In terms of mobile operators, the majority uses Telenor, accompanying 42% and MPT takes the second place. (Figure 7)

Figure 6: Accessibility of Phone (Respondents=1,174)





Figure 7: Mobile Operators that Respondents used (Respondents=1,174)



#### 3.3.2 Internet

According to Figure 8 and 9, during the survey period, 89% of the respondents were the fibre internet users (FTTH Wifi) which is the highest percentage. There are also a few respondents who used international or foreign sim cards such as Thai Sim Card, China Sim Card and Sim Crew. More people state that there were time limitations in using the internet and it is 66%.

Figure 8: Types of Internets that Respondents used (Respondents=988)





Figure 9: Accessibility of Internet (Respondents=988)



## **3.4** Aids

Only 6% of respondents reported receiving any form of aid in their respective wards or villages. Of the small number who had received aid, food rations were the most common, followed by financial and security aid. 45% of the respondents reveal that they need aid relating to security the most while 25% feel that it is money that they need the most. 16% state that help is needed in vocations.

Table 2: Aids


Status on Receiving Aids (Respondents=1,174)	%	Most Needed Type of Aid by the Respondent's Family (Respondents=1,174)	%
No, I have not received any aids.	94	Healthcare	2
Yes, I have received.	6	Financial Aid	25
Aids the wards/villages have received so far(Respondents=51)		Mental Well-being	9
Food	51	Shelter	2
Financial Aid	38	Security	45
Healthcare	10	Food	1
Security	35	Vocation	16
Vocation	2	Basic healthcare (medicines), Money withdrawal in times of no internet access	0
Shelter	14		

# 3.5 Knowledge, Trust and Attitudes on Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) National Unity Government (NUG) and Federal Army

#### 3.5.1 Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)

Almost all of the respondents (99%) know the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Most of them knew it through Facebook. 26% of them knew it from other communication channels such as Telegram and Viber and this figure occupies the second place. The "Friends" category is in the third place with 19%. (Figure 10). Among the respondents who know or are aware of CRPH, 64% totally trust the CRPH to find a solution for this current political problem. Only a very small percentage (2%) did not trust the CRPH to find a solution. (Figure 11)

Figure 10: Sources of How the Respondent Got to Know the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) (Respondents=1,167)



29%

Not trust at all

A bit trust

Moderately trust

Totally trust

Figure 11: Trust in CRPH (Respondents=1,167)

#### 3.5.2 National Unity Government (NUG)

Just like CRPH, almost all of the respondents (99%) know or are aware of the National Unity Government (NUG) and the majority knew it from Facebook. In addition, communications channels such as Telegram and Viber accounts for 27% and this figure occupies the second place. The third highest percentage of the respondents, 19%, got to know NUG from their friends and acquaintances. (Figure 12). More than one third of the respondents think that NUG absolutely represents the civilians. (Figure 13)

Figure 12: Sources of How the Respondent Got to Know the National Unity Government (NUG) (Respondents=1,167)





Figure 13: Attitudes towards the representation of the National Unity Government (NUG) (Respondents=1,167)



#### 3.5.3 Federal Army

This also follows the same pattern of CRPH and NUG. Nearly all respondents (96%) knew about the Federal Armyfrom Facebook. Communication channels such as Telegram and Viber follow Facebook with 27%. The third source of information that respondents got to know about the army is from Friends and Acquaintances. (Figure 14). More than one third of respondents have complete trust in the Federal Army. (Figure 15)

Figure 14: Sources of How the Respondent Got to Know the Federal Army (Respondents= 1,129)






Figure 15: Trust in Federal Army (Respondents=1,129)



#### 3.6 Trust in Tatmadaw's Promise to the Civilians

In determining how much trust the people have in Tatmadaw, nearly every respondent (97%) does not think that Tatmadaw will keep its promise on holding re-elections one year after coup. (Figure- 16)

Figure 16: Trust in Tatmadaw's promise on holding re-elections after one year (Respondents=1,774)



## 3.7 Attitudes Towards the Future of Myanmar

Positive attitudes towards Myanmar's political, economic, education and social situations in the coming year (2022) accounts for the highest percentage (32%). According to the qualitative study<sup>2</sup> we conducted prior to this quantitative research, people believe that their revolution will win, they can get rid of military dictatorship soon and in 2022 they will be collectively building a better system for country's development. 28% of the respondents feel that these situations will improve in a moderate manner. 27% feel that things will worsen in the coming year.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Nyan Corridor has published the qualitative research report in Burmese version in June 2021 via Nyan Corridor Facebook Page. The report can be extracted through this link: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/109230837914000/posts/154728010030949/?d=n">https://www.facebook.com/109230837914000/posts/154728010030949/?d=n</a>




Figure 17: Myanmar's Situation in 2022 (Respondents = 1,774)

#### 4. Conclusion

According to the findings of this research, the military coup staged on 1st February 2021 has major impacts on the everyday lives of people in Myanmar. Survey respondents reported a significant drop in household income; many families are left with no source of income. However, only a small number of respondents reported receiving aid: in the few cases where aid was received it took the form of food rations, financial and security. At this moment, the most needed type of aid are financial aids and aids relating to vocations of individuals.

During the time of survey, only Fiber internet was accessible due to country-wide internet shutdowns. Time limit was imposed on the available internet access as well.

Almost all of the respondents got to know the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Union Government (NUG) and the Federal Army from Facebook. People have very high levels of trust in them and feel that they represent the people of Myanmar. On the other hand, there is very little trust in Tatmadaw's promise to hold elections. There are people who think that situations of Myanmar would get better than the current state. There are also some who feel the opposite.

We would like to encourage the respondents of this survey to participate in the upcoming surveys as well because the findings of public opinion survey of this kind are aimed to provide insights to the people's democratically elected representatives people's elected representatives concerned for them to pragmatically respond to the issues in a timely manner. The survey communicates the views of the people of Myanmar to national governments and the international community. We also would like to convey our gratitude to everyone who participated in this survey.